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Let  } , , 2 , 1 { n N  =  be a nonempty set of players considering possibilities of cooperation. This 
kind of situations are modeled in von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) by means of games in 
characteristic function form. A cooperative game with player set N  is a function  R →
N w 2 : , 
assigning to each group of players (coalition)  N S ⊆ , its worth  ) (S w  obtained as a result of 
achieved cooperation; it is assumed that  0 ) ( = φ w . In this paper we will refer to elements of 
N 2  
as crisp coalitions. For each crisp coalition S , its characteristic vector is 
S e , with  1 ) ( = i
S e  if 
S i∈  and  0 ) ( = i
S e  otherwise. The set of cooperative crisp games with player set N  is denoted 
by 
N G . 
Note that in a cooperative crisp game each player may have only two variants of participation 
in a crisp coalition: full participation or non-involvement at all. However, more freedom may be 
given to players by considering fuzzy cooperation, that is participation at any level between 
non-cooperation and full cooperation. 
The class of cooperative games with fuzzy coalitions is introduced in Aubin (1974) together 
with his solution concept of core. Formally, a fuzzy coalition of player set N  is a vector s in 
N ] 1 , 0 [ , where the i -th coordinate  i s  is referred to as the participation level of player i . The 
empty coalition in a fuzzy setting is  ) 0 ,..., 0 ( =
φ e , and 
S e , with 
N S 2 ∈ , denotes a crisp-like 
coalition. We call 
S e  a crisp-like coalition because it corresponds to the situation where the 
players within S  fully cooperate (i.e., they have participation level 1) and the players outside S  
are not involved at all in cooperation (i.e., they have participation level 0).  ) 1 ,..., 1 ( =
N e  is called 
the grand coalition. We often write 
i e  instead of 
} {i e . In this paper the set of fuzzy coalitions is 
denoted by 
N F . 
A cooperative fuzzy game with player set N   is a function  R →
N F v: , with  0 ) ( =
φ e v , 
assigning to each fuzzy coalition s the value achieved by cooperation. Here we denote the set of 
fuzzy games with player set  N  by 
N FG . 
 The purpose of this paper is to study cores and stable sets for fuzzy games. In Section 2, we 
review definitions of the core, the dominance core, and the stable set (von 
Neumann-Morgenstern solution) in crisp games and their basic properties. In Section 3 we define 
solutions like the dominance core and stable sets for fuzzy games and study their interrelations as 
well as the relation with Aubin’s core. Also we analyze relations with the corresponding notions 
for crisp games, namely the dominance core and the stable set, using the crisp operator 
N N G FG cr → : . For a fuzzy game 
N FG v∈ , the corresponding crisp game 
N G v cr w ∈ = ) (  is 
given by  ) ( ) (
S e v S w =  for each 
N S 2 ∈ . Further, for a fuzzy game v  we also define a new notion, 
namely that of proper core, denoted by  ) (v C
P , and study its relations with the other cores of 
v (including the core of the corresponding crisp games  ) (v C
cr ) and stable sets for cooperative  3
fuzzy games. 
In Section 4 special attention is paid to the class of convex fuzzy games, introduced by Branzei 
et al. (2002), and their cores and stable sets. The fact that the core is itself a stable set for convex 
crisp games, shown in Shapley (1971) is extended to convex fuzzy games. Section 5 is devoted to 
the special class of fuzzy clan games. 
 
 
2. Cores and stable sets for crisp games 
 
Let 
N G w∈  and let  ) (w I  be the imputation set of w, i.e. 
} each for }) ({ ), (   | { ) ( N   i     i w  x N w x x w I i
N i
i
N ∈ ≥ = ∑ ∈ =
∈
R . 
Here we denote by 
N R  the n-dimensional Euclidean space. 
The core  ) (w C  of a crisp game w is the subset of imputations which are stable against any 
possible deviation by a coalition, i.e. 






N   S     S w x   N w x x w C ∈ = ∑ = ∑ ∈ =
∈ ∈
R . 
Let  ) ( , w I y x ∈  and  let 
N S 2 ∈ . We say x  dominates  y  via  S , denoted by  y dom x S     , if (i) 




. The two conditions are interpreted as follows. Let 
y dom x S     . Then 
(i)  i i y x >  for each  S i∈ , means that the imputation  ) , , ( 1 n x x x m =  is better than the imputation 
) , , ( 1 n y y y m =  for all players  S i∈ ; 




 means that the payoff  ∑
∈ S i
i x  is reachable by the coalition S . 
 
Remark 1. Note that  y dom x S      implies  N S ≠  because  from  i i y x >  for  all  N i∈  it  follows 
∑ ∑ >
∈ ∈ N i
i
N i
i y x , in contradiction with  ) ( , w I y x ∈ . Further  y dom x i      } {  implies  i i y x i w > ≥ }) ({  
which contradicts the fact that  ) (w I y∈ . 
 
We simply say x  dominates  y , denoted by  y dom x      , if there is a coalition S  such  that 
y dom x S     . The negation of  y dom x       is denoted here by  y dom x      ¬ . 
The dominance core (D-core)  ) (w DC  of a crisp game w is the set of imputations which are not 
dominated by any other imputation, i.e. 
)} (   all for        | ) ( { ) ( w I y x dom y w I x w DC ∈ ¬ ∈ = .  4
 A stable set of a crisp game w is a nonempty set K  of imputations satisfying the properties: 
(i) (Internal stability) For all  K y x ∈ , ,  y dom x      ¬ .  
(ii) (External stability) For all  K w I z \ ) ( ∈ , there is an imputation  K x∈  such that  z dom x      . 
We briefly recall some well-known facts for a crisp game w, which are interesting for our 
paper: 
(1) The core  ) (w C   is a subset of the D-core  ) (w DC , and both sets are convex sets 
(Gillies(1953)). 
(2) If  φ = ) (w DC , then, according to (1),  φ = = ) ( ) ( w DC w C . If  φ ≠ ) (w DC , then a sufficient 
condition for the coincidence of  ) (w C  and  ) (w DC , is  ∑ + ≥
∈ S N i
i w S w N w
\
}) ({ ) ( ) ( , for each 
N S ⊆ (Shapley and Shubik (1969), Rafels and Tijs (1997), Chang (2000)). 
(3) Each stable set contains the D-core  ) (w DC . 
(4) For each convex crisp game  w there is only one stable set, which coincides with the D-core 
) (w DC  (Shapley (1971)). 
(5) If  ) ( ) ( w DC w C ≠  then  φ = ) (w C  (this is a consequence of (2) and the Bondareva-Shapley 
theorem (Bondareva (1963), Shapley (1967)). 
For details we refer the reader to the books of Driessen (1988), Owen (1995), and Tijs (2003). 
 
 
3. Cores and stable sets for fuzzy games 
 
Let 
N FG v∈  and let  ) (v I  be the imputation set of v , i.e. 






N ∈ ≥ = ∑ ∈ =
∈
R . 
The core (Aubin (1974))  ) (v C  of a fuzzy game v  is the subset of imputations which are stable 
against any possible deviation by fuzzy coalitions, i.e. 







N F   s     s v x s   e v x x v C ∈ ≥ ∑ = ∑ ∈ =
∈ ∈
R . 
Now we introduce two other cores for a fuzzy game v , namely the proper core and the crisp 
core, by weakening the stability conditions. 
Let 
N F s∈ . From now on we use the notation  } 0 | { ) ( > ∈ = i s N i s car . We call  s a proper fuzzy 
coalition if  N s car ≠ ) ( . The set of proper fuzzy coalitions is denoted by 
N PF . To define the proper 
core  ) (v C
P  of a fuzzy game v , we consider only stability regarding proper fuzzy coalitions, i.e. 







N P PF   s     s v x s   e v x x v C ∈ ≥ ∑ = ∑ ∈ =
∈ ∈
R . 
Further, if we consider only crisp-like coalitions 
S e  in the stability conditions, one obtains the  5
crisp core  ) (v C
cr  of the fuzzy game v , i.e. 








N cr   S     e v x   e v x x v C
S ∈ ≥ ∑ = ∑ ∈ =
∈ ∈
R . 
Note that the crisp core  ) (v C
cr  of a fuzzy game v  is also the core of the crisp game  ) (v cr w = .  
One can easily see that both cores  ) (v C
P  and  ) (v C
cr  are convex sets. 
Let  ) ( , v I y x ∈  and  let 
N F s∈ . We say x  dominates  y  via  s , denoted by  y dom x s     , if (i) 
i i y x >  for all  ) (s car i∈  and (ii)  ) (s v x s
N i
i i ≤ ∑
∈
. The two conditions are interpreted as follows. Let 
y dom x s     . Then 
(i)  i i y x >  and thus  i i i i y s x s >  for each  ) (s car i∈ , means that the imputation  ) , , ( 1 n x x x  =  is 
better than the imputation  ) , , ( 1 n y y y  =  for all (active) players  ) (s car i∈ ; 
(ii)  ) (s v x s
N i
i i ≤ ∑
∈
 means that the payoff  ∑
∈ N i
i ix s  is reachable by the fuzzy coalition s. 
 
Remark 2.  Note that  y dom x s      implies 
N PF s∈  because from  i i y x >  for all  N i∈  it follows 
∑ ∑ >
∈ ∈ N i
i
N i
i y x , in contradiction with  ) ( , v I y x ∈ . It is, however, to be noted that  1 | ) ( | = s car  is 
possible. 
 
We simply say x dominates  y , denoted by  y dom x      , if there is a (proper) fuzzy coalition s 
such that  y dom x s     . The negation of  y dom x       is denoted here by  y dom x      ¬ . 
The dominance core (D-core) ) (v DC  of a fuzzy game v  is the set of imputations which are not 
dominated by any other imputation, i.e. 
)} (   all for        | ) ( { ) ( v I y x dom y v I x v DC ∈ ¬ ∈ = . 
 A stable set of a fuzzy game v  is a nonempty set  K  of imputations satisfying the properties: 
(i) (Internal stability) For all  K y x ∈ , ,  y dom x      ¬ .  
(ii) (External stability) For all  K v I z \ ) ( ∈ , there is an imputation  K x∈  such that  z dom x      . 
 
Theorem 1. Let v  be a fuzzy game. Then 
(i)  ) ( ) ( ) ( v C v C v C
cr P ⊂ ⊂ ; 
(ii)  ) ( ) ( v DC v C
P ⊂ ; 
(iii) For each stable set K : K v DC ⊂ ) ( . 
Proof.  The theorem is trivially true if  φ = ) (v I . So, suppose in the following that  φ ≠ ) (v I .  
(i) This follows straightforwardly from the definitions. 
(ii) Let  ) ( \ ) ( v DC v I x∈ . Then there are  ) (v I y∈  and 
N PF s∈  satisfying  i i x y >  for  each  6
) (s car i∈  and  ) (s v y s
N i
i i ≤ ∑
∈
. Then  ) (
) ( ) (




i i ≤ ∑ ∑ <
∈ ∈
. Hence  ) ( \ ) ( v C v I x
P ∈ . We 
conclude that  ) ( ) ( v DC v C
P ⊂ . 
(iii) Let K   be a stable set. Since  ) (v DC   consists of undominated imputations and each 
imputation in  K v I \ ) (  is dominated by some imputation by the external stability property, it 
follows that  K v DC ⊂ ) ( .        Q.E.D. 
 
In the next theorem we give sufficient conditions for the coincidence of the proper core and the 
dominance core. 
 
Theorem 2. Let 
N FG v∈ . Suppose  0 ) ( ) ( ) (
) ( \
≥ − ∑ −
∈
s v e v e v
s car N i
i N  for  each 
N F s∈ . Then 
) ( ) ( v DC v C
P = . 
Proof. Note that  φ = = ) ( ) ( v DC v C
P  if  φ = ) (v I . Suppose  φ ≠ ) (v I . From Theorem 1(ii) it 
follows that  ) ( ) ( v DC v C
P ⊂ . We show the converse inclusion by proving that  ) (v C x
P ∈ /  implies 
) (v DC x∈ / . Let  ) ( \ ) ( v C v I x
P ∈ . Then there is 
N PF s∈  such  that  ) (   s v x s
N i
i i ∑ <
∈
. For each 
) (s car i∈  take  0 > i ε  such that  ∑ = +
∈ ) (
) ( ) (
s car i
i i i s v x s ε . Define 









− ) ( each  for       )) ( ) ( ) ( ( | ) ( \ | ) (
) ( each  for     
) ( \
1 s car i s v e v e v s car N e v
s car i x
y






    Note  that  ) (
N
N i
i e v y = ∑
∈
,  ) (
i
i i e v x y ≥ >  for  each  ) (s car i∈  and,  since 
0 ) ( ) ( ) (
) ( \
≥ − ∑ −
∈
s v e v e v
s car N i
i N , we have  ) (
i
i e v y ≥  for each  ) ( \ s car N i∈ . Hence  ) (v I y∈ . Now, 
since  i i x y >  for  all  ) (s car i∈  and  ) (s v y s
N i
i i = ∑
∈
 we  have  x dom y s     ; thus  ) ( \ ) ( v DC v I x∈ .           
Q.E.D. 
 
Remark 3. Let 
N FG v∈ . Take the crisp game  ) (v cr w = . Then  ∑ + ≥
∈ ) ( \
) ( ) ( ) (
s car N i
i N e v s v e v  for each 
N F s∈  implies  ∑ + ≥
∈ S N i
i w S w N w
\
}) ({ ) ( ) ( , for each  N S ⊆ . So Theorem 2 can be seen as an 
extension of property (2) for crisp games. 
  7
From Theorem 2 we obtain the following corollary. 
 
Corollary 1. Let 
N FG v∈  with  0 ) ( ≥
i e v  for each  N i∈ and  ) ( ) ( v DC v C
P ≠ . Then  φ = ) (v C
P . 
Proof.  ) ( ) ( v DC v C
P ≠  implies  that  φ ≠ ) (v I   and that there is a 
N PF t∈  with 
) ( ) ( ) (
) ( \
N
t car N i
i e v e v t v > ∑ +
∈
  by Theorem 2. By  0 ) ( ≥




i e v x = ∑
∈
 for each  ) (v I x∈ . Hence  
∑∑ ≤ = ∑
∈∈ ∈ ) () ( t car it car i
i i i
N i
i i x x t x t ) ( ) ( ) (
) ( \ ) ( \
t v e v e v x x
t car N i
i N
t car N i
i
N i
i < ∑ − ≤ ∑ − ∑ =
∈ ∈ ∈
 
holds for each  ) (v I x∈ . Thus there is no  ) (v I x∈  such  that  ) (v C x
P ∈ . Hence,  φ = ) (v C
P .    
Q.E.D. 
 
 We next prove that for a fuzzy game the dominance core is a convex set. 
 
Lemma 1.  Let v  be a fuzzy game with  0 ) ( ≥
i e v  for each  N i∈ . Let v  be the fuzzy game given 
by  } ) ( ) ( ), ( min{ ) (
) ( \
∑ − =
∈ s car N i
i N e v e v s v s v . Then  ) ( ) ( ) ( v C v DC v DC
P = = . 
Proof. Note that  φ = = = ) ( ) ( ) ( v C v DC v DC
P  if  φ = ) (v I . Suppose  φ ≠ ) (v I . It implies 
) ( ) ( v I v I = . Thus to prove  ) ( ) ( v DC v DC = , it is sufficient to show that for  ) ( , v I y x ∈  and 
N F s∈ ,  y dom x s      in v  if and only if  y dom x s      in v . We only have to show that for  ) (v I x∈  
and 
N F s∈ ,  ) (s v x s
N i
i i ≤ ∑
∈
 if and only if  ) (s v x s
N i
i i ≤ ∑
∈
. 
  The ‘if’ part follows from  ) ( ) ( s v s v ≤ . For the ‘only if’ part note that for 
N F s∈  and  ) (v I x∈  we 
have  ∑ − ≤ ∑ − ∑ = ∑ ≤ ∑ = ∑
∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ) ( \ ) ( \ ) ( ) (
) ( ) (
s car N i
i N









i i e v e v x x x x s x s , where the first inequality 
follows from  0 ) ( ≥ ≥
i
i e v x  for each  N s car i   ) ( ⊆ ∈ . Hence,  ) (s v x s
N i
i i ≤ ∑
∈
 implies  ) (s v x s
N i
i i ≤ ∑
∈
. 
Since we have  ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
) ( \ ) ( \
N N
s car N i
i
s car N i
i e v e v e v s v e v s v = ≤ ∑ + ≤ ∑ +
∈ ∈
 by  ) ( ) (
i i e v e v ≤ , we obtain 
) ( ) ( v C v DC
P =  by Theorem 2.   Q.E.D. 
 
  Let 
N FG v∈ . Define the fuzzy game  ' v  by  ∑ − =
∈ ) (
) ( ) ( ) ( '
s car i
i
i e v s s v s v  for each 
N F s∈ . Note that 
0 ) ( ' =
i e v  for  each  N i∈ .  From Lemma 1 it follows that  ) ' (v DC   is a convex set, because 
) ' (v C
P   is a convex set. Since for an arbitrary fuzzy game v   8
)) ( , ), ( ), ( ( ) ' ( ) (
2 1 n e v e v e v v DC v DC  + =  holds, where  )) ( , ), ( ), ( ( ) ' (
2 1 n e v e v e v v DC  +  
))} ( , ), ( ), ( ( ), ' ( | {
2 1 n e v e v e v y v DC x y x  = ∈ + = , we obtain the following theorem. 
 
Theorem 3. For each fuzzy game v  the dominance core  ) (v DC  is a convex set. 
 
 We end this section with two examples that illustrate the results in the above theorems. 
 
Example 1. Let  } 2 , 1 { = N  and  let  R →
} 2 , 1 { :F v  be  given  by  1 ) , ( 2 1 2 1 − + = s s s s v  for  each 
} 2 , 1 { F s∈ . Further, let  1 v  and  2 v  be given by 
) ( ) ( 1 s v s v =  if  ) 2 / 1   , 0 ( ≠ s  and  4 ) 2 / 1   , 0 ( 1 = v , 
) ( ) ( 2 s v s v =  if  ) 2 / 1   , 2 / 1 ( ≠ s  and  4 ) 2 / 1   , 2 / 1 ( 2 = v . 
Let  } 1 , 0 , 0 | { 2 1 2 1
2 = + ≥ ≥ ∈ = ∆ x x x x x R . Then 
(i)  ∆ = = = = ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( v I v DC v C v C
P  
(ii)  ∆ = = = = ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( 1 1 1 1 v I v DC v C v C
P φ  
(iii)  ∆ = = = = ) ( ) ( ) ( , ) ( 2 2 2 2 v I v DC v C v C
P φ  
(iv) For v , 1 v , and  2 v , the imputation set ∆  is the unique stable set. 




s car N i
i e v e v s v > ∑ +
∈
 for  ) 2 / 1   , 2 / 1 ( = s  and  ) ( ) ( 2 2 v DC v C
P = . Hence, the 
sufficient condition in Theorem 2 for the equality  ) ( ) ( v DC v C
P =  is not a necessary condition. 
 
In the next example we give a fuzzy game v  with  ) ( ) ( v DC v C ≠  and  φ ≠ ) (v C . For a crisp game 
w we have according to (5) that  φ = ) (w C  if  ) ( ) ( w DC w C ≠ . 
 
Example 2. Let  } 2 , 1 { = N  and let  R →
} 2 , 1 { :F v  be given by  1 1 ) 1 , ( s s v =  for all 
} 2 , 1 {
1 ) 1 , ( F s ∈ , 
and  0 ) , ( 2 1 = s s v  otherwise.  Then  } 1 | ) , {( ) ( 2 1
2
2 1 = + ∈ = + x x x x v I R , 
) ( } 2 / 1 0 | ) ( { ) ( 1 v I x v I x v C ≠ ≤ ≤ ∈ = , and  ) ( ) ( ) ( v I v DC v C




4. Cores and stable sets for convex fuzzy games 
  
A special class of fuzzy games with a nonempty core is the class of convex fuzzy games 
introduced in Branzei et al.(2002). Here 
N FG v∈  is called convex if it satisfies the properties: 
(i) (Supermodularity)  ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( t v s v t s v t s v + ≥ ∧ + ∨  for  all 
N F t s ∈ , , where  t s ∨  and  t s ∧  are 
those elements of 
N ] 1 , 0 [  with  the  i -th coordinate equal to  } , max{ i i t s  and  } , min{ i i t s ,  9
respectively, for each  N i∈ . 




− = −  
for each  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ t  is a convex function, where for each  N i∈ , 
N F s∈  and  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ t ,  ) || ( t s
i −  is the 
element in 
N F  such that  j j
i s t s =
− ) || (  for each  } { \ i N j∈  and  t t s i
i =
− ) || ( . 
 Convex fuzzy games form a convex cone. It is proved in Branzei et al. (2002) that the core of a 
convex fuzzy game v  coincides with the core of the corresponding crisp game  ) (v cr w= . 
 
Lemma 2. Let v  be a convex fuzzy game. Take  ) ( , v I y x ∈  and suppose  y dom x s      for some 
N F s∈ . Then  2 | ) ( | ≥ s car . 
Proof. Take  ) ( , v I y x ∈  and suppose  y dom x s      for some 
N F s∈  with  } { ) ( i s car = . Then  i i y x >  
and  ) (
i




i e s v e v s ≥ . Thus we have 




i i i e v s e s v x y ≤ ≤ <   which is a contradiction with the individual rationality of y .                          
Q.E.D. 
 
Theorem 4. The dom relations for a convex fuzzy game v  and its corresponding crisp game w 
coincide, i.e. for all  ) ( ) ( , w I v I y x = ∈ :  y dom x       in v  if and only if  y dom x       in   ) (v cr w= . 






N ∈ ≥ = ∑ ∈ =
∈
R  and  
} each  for    }) ({    ), ( | { ) ( N i i w x N w x x w I i
N i
i
N ∈ ≥ = ∑ ∈ =
∈
R  coincide  because  ) ( ) (
N e v N w =  and 
) ( }) ({
i e v i w =  for each  N i∈ .  
To prove the ‘if’ part, let  ) ( ) ( , v I w I y x = ∈  and  y dom x S      for some 
N S 2 ∈ . Then it  implies 
y dom x S e       in v . 
Now we prove the ‘only if’ part. Let  ) ( ) ( , w I v I y x = ∈  and  y dom x s      for some 
N F s∈ . Let 
| } 1 0 | { | ) ( < < ∈ = i s N i s ϕ . As we noted in Remark 2,  n s < ) ( ϕ . It is sufficient to prove, by 
induction on  } 1 , , 1 , 0 { ) ( − ∈ n s  ϕ , that  y dom x s      implies  y dom x       in w.  
 Clearly, if  0 ) ( = s ϕ  then  y dom x car(s)     , because  0 ) ( = s ϕ  implies that s is a crisp-like coalition. 
 Suppose now that the assertion ‘ y dom x s      in v  with  k s = ) ( ϕ  implies  y dom x       in w’ holds for 
each k  with  n r k < < ≤ 0 . Take 
N F s∈  with  r s = ) ( ϕ , and  N i∈  such that  1 0 < < i s , and take 
) ( , v I y x ∈  such  that  y dom x s     . Then    i i y x >  for  each  ) (s car i∈  and  ) (s v x s ≤ ⋅ . Further 
2 | ) ( | ≥ s car   by Lemma 2. We note that s   can be represented by a convex combination of 
i
ie s s a − =  and 
i
i e s s b ) 1 ( − + = , i.e.  b s a s s i i + − = ) 1 ( . Note that  1 ) ( − = r a ϕ  and  1 ) ( − = r b ϕ . 
Further  1 | ) ( | | ) ( | − = s car a car ,  | ) ( | | ) ( |   s car b car = . 
  The inequality  ) (s v x s ≤ ⋅  implies  ) ( ) 1 ( s v x b s x a s i i ≤ ⋅ + ⋅ − . The (coordinate-wise) convexity 
of v  induces  ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( b v s a v s s v i i + − ≤ . Hence  x b s x a s i i ⋅ + ⋅ − ) 1 (   
) ( ) ( ) 1 ( b v s a v s i i + − ≤  which  implies 0 )) ( ( )) ( )( 1 ( ≤ − ⋅ + − ⋅ − b v x b s a v x a s i i ; thus ) (a v x a ≤ ⋅  or  10
) (b v x b ≤ ⋅ . We want to show that  
                                                           y dom x a      or  y dom x b     .                                                      (∗ ) 
The following three cases should be considered: 
(1)  ) (b v x b ≤ ⋅ . Then  y dom x b     , since  2 | ) ( | ≥ b car .  
(2)  ) (b v x b > ⋅  and  3 | ) ( | ≥ s car . Then  ) (a v x a ≤ ⋅ ; thus  y dom x a     , since  2 | ) ( | ≥ a car .  
(3)  ) (b v x b > ⋅  and  2 | ) ( | = s car . Then we have  ) (a v x a ≤ ⋅  and  1 | ) ( | = a car . By the convexity of 
v   and the individual rationality, we obtain  ) (a v x a ≥ ⋅ . In fact, let 
j
je s a = . Then the 




j e s v e v s ≥ . By the individual rationality, we obtain 
) (
j




j j j = ≥ ≥ = ⋅ . So  ) (a v x a = ⋅ , which is 
contradictory to  0 )) ( ( )) ( )( 1 ( ≤ − ⋅ + − ⋅ − b v x b s a v x a s i i , implying that case (3) does not 
occur.  
Hence (∗ ) holds. Since  1 ) ( ) ( − = = r b a ϕ ϕ  the induction hypothesis implies that  y dom x      in w.                               
Q.E.D. 
 
Theorem 5. Let v  be a convex fuzzy game and  ) (v cr w= . Then 
(i)  ) ( ) ( ) ( v C v C v C
cr P = = ; 
(ii)  ) ( ) ( w DC v DC = ; 
(iii)  ) ( ) ( v DC v C = . 
Proof. (i) For convex fuzzy games  ) ( ) ( w C v C =  (see Theorem 7 in Branzei et al. (2002). Now, we 
use Theorem 1(i). 
(ii) From Theorem 4 we conclude that  ) ( ) ( w DC v DC = . 
(iii) Since v   is a convex fuzzy game we have  ∑ + ≥
∈ ) ( \
) ( ) ( ) (
s car N i
i N e v s v e v  for  each 
N F s∈ . We 
obtain by Theorem 2:  ) ( ) ( v DC v C
P = . Now we use (i).               Q.E.D. 
 
 The next theorem extends the result of Shapley (1971) that each crisp convex game has a unique 
stable set coinciding with the dominance core. 
 
Theorem 6. Let v  be a convex fuzzy game. Then there is a unique stable set, namely  ) (v DC . 
Proof. Let  ) (v cr w= . Then by Shapley’s result,  ) (w DC  is the unique stable set of  w. In view of 
Theorem 4, the set of stable sets of v  and w coincide, and by Theorem 5(ii)  ) ( ) ( w DC v DC = . So, 
the unique stable set of v  is  ) (v DC .                 Q.E.D. 
 
Note that the game v  in Example 1 is convex, but  1 v  and  2 v  are not. 
 
  11
5. Cores and stable sets for fuzzy clan games 
 
  In this section games of the form  R → ×
2 1 } 1 , 0 { ] 1 , 0 [ :
N N v  with  φ = ∩ 2 1 N N ,  0 ) ( =
φ e v  are 
considered, where players in  1 N  have participation levels which may vary between 0 and 1, while 
the players in  2 N  are crisp players in the sense that they can fully cooperate or not at all. We 
denote  2 1 N N ∪  by  N . 
 Let  R → ×
2 1 } 1 , 0 { ] 1 , 0 [ :
N N v .  W e  c a n  d e f i n e  i n  a n  o b v i o u s  w a y  t h e  p r o p e r  c o r e   ) (v C
P , the 
dominance core  ) (v DC , the crisp core  ) (v C
cr  and stable sets K . Then modifying the proofs in 
Theorems 1,2 and 3 we obtain 
 
Theorem 7. Let  R → ×
2 1 } 1 , 0 { ] 1 , 0 [ :
N N v . Then 
(i)  ) ( ) ( ) ( v C v C v C
cr P ⊂ ⊂ ; 
(ii)  ) ( ) ( v DC v C
P ⊂ ; further, if  0 ) ( ) ( ) (
) ( \
≥ − ∑ −
∈
s v e v e v
s car N i
i N  for  each 
2 1 } 1 , 0 { ] 1 , 0 [
N N s × ∈ , then 
) ( ) ( v DC v C
P = ; 
(iii)  ) (v DC  is a convex set; 
(iv) For each stable set  K , we have  K v DC ⊂ ) ( .  
 
Special attention is given to a subclass of such games, which we have called fuzzy clan games 
(Tijs et al. (2002)), where the clan members are the crisp players. Fuzzy clan games are defined 
using veto power of clan members, monotonicity, and a condition reflecting the fact that an 
increase in participation level of a non-clan member in growing coalitions containing at least all 
clan members with full participation level results in a decrease of the average marginal return of 
that player (DAMR-property). 
In the following 
N
C F  stands for 
C C N } 1 , 0 { ] 1 , 0 [
\ × .  
Formally, a game  R F v
N
C → :  is a fuzzy clan game with clan C  if v satisfies the following three 
properties: 
(i) (Veto-power of clan members)  0 ) ( = s v  if  C C s 1 ≠ ; 
(ii) (Monotonicity)  ) ( ) ( t v s v ≤  for all 
N
C F t s ∈ ,  with  t s ≤ ; 
(iii) (DAMR-property for non-clan members) for each  C N i \ ∈ , all 
N
C F s s 1
2 1, ∈  and all 0 , 2 1 > ε ε  such 
that 
2 1 s s ≤  and 
i i e s e s 2
2
1
1 0 ε ε − ≤ − ≤  we have  





i i e s v s v e s v s v ε ε ε ε − − ≥ − −
− − . 
 
Property (i) expresses the fact that the full participation level of all clan members is a necessary 
condition for generating a positive reward for coalitions.  12
 Fuzzy clan games for which the clan consists of a single player are called fuzzy big boss games, 
with the single clan member as the big boss. For fuzzy clan games we have additionally 
 
Theorem 8. Let v  be a fuzzy clan game with player set  N  and clan C . Then  ) ( ) ( v C v DC
P = . 
Proof. From the veto-power property we have that  0 ) ( =
i e v  for each  N i∈  if  1 | | > C . Then the 
monotonicity of v  implies  0 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
) ( \
≥ − = − ∑ −
∈
s v e v s v e v e v
N
s car N i
i N  for each 
N F s∈ . One can 
easily check that in the case  1 | | = C , with  } {n C =   0 ) ( ) ( ) (
) ( \
≥ − ∑ −
∈
s v e v e v
s car N i
i N  for each 
N F s∈ , 
too. The equality  ) ( ) ( v C v DC
P =  follows then from Theorem 7(ii).                            Q.E.D. 
 
  Now we give two examples of fuzzy clan games v  to illustrate situations like  ) ( ) ( v C v DC ≠  
and  K v DC ≠ ) ( , respectively. 
 
Example 3. Let  } 2 , 1 { = N  and let  R → × } 1 , 0 { ] 1 , 0 [ : v  be given for all  ] 1 , 0 [ 1 ∈ s  by  1 1 ) 1 , ( s s v =  
and  0 ) 0 , ( 1 = s v . This is a big boss game with player 2 as the big boss, so  φ ≠ ) (v C . Moreover, as 
in Example 2, we obtain 
} 2 / 1 0 | ) ( { ) ( 1 ≤ ≤ ∈ = x v I x v C ,  } 1 | ) , {( ) ( 2 1
2
2 1 = + ∈ = + x x x x v DC R , so  ) ( ) ( v C v DC ≠ . Note that 
} 1 | ) , {( ) ( 2 1
2
2 1 = + ∈ = + x x x x v I R  is the unique stable set.  
 
The following example shows that  ) (v DC  can be a proper subset of a stable set. 
 
Example 4. Let  } 3 , 2 , 1 { = N  and let v  be given by  0 ) 0 , , ( 2 1 = s s v  and  } 1   ,   min{ ) 1 , , ( 2 1 2 1 s s s s v + =  
for all 
2
2 1 ] 1 , 0 [ ) , ( ∈ s s . Then  )} 1 , 0 , 0 {( ) ( = v DC  and no element in  ) (v I  is dominated by  ) 1 , 0 , 0 ( . 
So  ) (v DC   is not a stable set. The set  } 1 0   |   ) 1   ,   , {(
, ≤ ≤ − = ε ε ε ε b a K
b a  when  + ∈ R b a,  with 
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